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Pathology or Plutocracy: The Misery of International Law 
Dr Mohsen al Attar 
 
I 
A casual student of international economic law (IEL) should be forgiven for wondering 
how the framework relates to capitalism. IEL may be the regulatory regime for global 
capitalism but this point is not always explicit in materials and, in fact, is frequently 
overlooked in favour of the technical nuts and bolts. This process is testimony to the hold 
that capitalism exerts over IEL—the economic model is presumed rather than deliberated—
despite its consequence to much of what is lamented about the legal regime by (critical) 
scholars and observers alike.  
 
From my own experience in the lecture theatre, I acknowledge that law students favour 
this approach. Doctrine, they believe, will smooth their path into a magic circle law firm. 
Their preference is more instinctive than reflective as law students, in my experience, tend 
toward economical illiteracy. Though this does not justify their apathy for IEL’s overriding 
capitalist influences, it does help explain it. We should, however, be less charitable toward 
IEL scholars who know all too well that the legal regime is symbiotic to the economic model 
and that a lack of familiarity with the latter will impoverish understanding of the former. 
Knowledge of the economic model is essential lest students come to view capitalism as 
amoral or even innate. Capitalism is both political and economic system. On one hand, it 
conveys the medium through which resources are allocated—the operation of the market—
while on the other it dictates the overriding aim—perpetual accumulation. These two 
characteristics help situate capitalism alongside its political predilections while provoking 
the awareness needed to understand the partisan quality of IEL and the attendant injustices 
that The Misery of International Law critiques.1  
 
Linarelli, Salomon, and Sornorajah are committed to unearthing the socio-political, 
historical, and moral dimensions of the global economy and their combined relationship to 
the architecture of IEL. In contrast to many other texts in the field, they reach beyond the 
regulatory capacities of the regime, targeting its constructivist character and tracing the 
conceptions of (in)justice that emerge. Travelling well beyond doctrine, they regale readers 
with a plethora of evidence about how IEL is experienced—frequently suffered—by the 
world’s masses. Deploying multiple approaches, they build a robust critique that evidences 
the partialities of IEL. Indeed, when coming to the end of the book, I found myself in 
possession of a persuasive account of the many injustices of IEL but, foremost, a sense of 
                                                                
1 John Linarelli, Margot E Salomon and Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2018). 
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the deterministic quality of the outcome, the latter of which qualifies their (limited) calls for 
reform. 
 
The Misery of International Law makes an important contribution to IEL, providing 
scholars and students alike a critical text that embraces the essential links between IEL, 
history, morality, and materialism. Their prose is accessible and the evidence compelling, 
inspiring the reader to want to learn more about the field (more on this later). In the 
following review, I discuss some reflections triggered by Misery.   
 
II 
My own research in IEL leads me to a banal conclusion: IEL is a field of economic 
regulation but also an instrument of social engineering. Each intervention devised in 
regulatory terms precipitates changes in the configuration of society. This is true across the 
gamut of IEL subfields, whether in finance, trade, or investment law, the disciplinary trinity 
that corrals both the field and the book. What does this mean for the representation of IEL? 
It means that most texts prove inadequate in conveying IEL’s sociolegal nuances, often 
presenting a utopian view—liberal—or a stunted one—doctrinal. Critical work abounds but 
entry-level scholarship in IEL, the kind that guides introductory modules and textbooks, 
begins and ends with legal instruments (the textual), perhaps straying into the subtext and 
context along the way.2 
 
On this path, IEL textbooks omit much including, most of all, critique of the underlying 
capitalist framework. Their respective authors might lament certain outcomes—inequality—
but they routinely return to misguided overtures about the benefits of global capitalism on 
poverty levels in China. (12-13) An IEL newcomer comes to see the field primarily in 
technical terms: the International Monetary Fund supports short-term stabilisation, the 
relaxation of capital controls is a natural outgrowth of the liberalisation of current account 
transactions, and investor-state dispute settlement procedures bolster investor confidence 
and capital in-flows. Self-evident as the shortcomings of this approach are, the fetishisation 
of rules perseveres with many scholars displaying neither remorse nor adventure. Enter 
Linarelli, Salomon, and Sornarajah. 
 
Notwithstanding the critical title, above all else, The Misery of International Law is a 
treatise on IEL. Bar the introduction, each chapter systematically adumbrates a subfield of 
IEL: finance, investment, trade, and, in recognition of their shared political disposition, a 
chapter on human rights closes the text. Evident from the title alone, the contribution is 
denoted by a dissident tenor as the scholars seek to re-locate IEL historically—within its 
                                                                
2 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘What Does It Mean to Take a Socio-Legal Approach to International Economic Law?’ 
in Amanda Perry-Kessaris (ed), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law (Routledge 2014). 
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Eurocentrism—and morally—through the lens of (in)justice. We thus find ourselves 
confronted by a book that takes IEL beyond its self-imposed parameters: Misery is driven by 
revulsion at IEL’s ‘legal rendering of immiseration’ and the complicity of IEL scholars in 
legitimising what the authors condemn as an immoral regime. (1) Their critique is wide-
ranging, crisscrossing the field of IEL, but also fastidious, unravelling each subfield with a 
scalpel. 
 
We are told that international trade law, for example, cannot be detached from 
Europe’s predatory past as a plethora of ‘atrocities, even genocide’ was deployed ‘so that 
Europeans could enjoy their natural freedom to trade.’ (111) Through historian Sven 
Beckert’s account of the cotton manufacturing industry, they explain that today’s fault lines 
in trade law are less the product of comparative advantage than of historical disruption: 
‘[w]e can see in the international market for cotton a forced restructuring of a global 
industry to enrich British and eventually American interests at the expense of both Indian 
weavers and African slaves.’ (114) The authors are of course in good company with James 
Gathii’s War, Commerce, and International Law detailing a similar record of predation and 
coercive trade in the history of commercial activity and international legality.3 
 
The subsequent chapter on international investment law equally charts a historical 
course verifying, once again, the self-serving benevolence upon which protection for foreign 
investors was fashioned. (147) Devised by the United States, the aim of the then nascent 
investment regime was to ensure that American investors received special protections when 
investing in Latin American states despite flying ‘in the face of the obvious principle that an 
alien is always subject to the jurisdiction of the state that he voluntarily enters.’ (155) 
Investor-bias persisted through the generations, proving itself immune to geopolitical shifts 
by surviving Chinese resistance, the Zapatista revolutions, decolonisation, and the NIEO 
along the way. ‘[T]hrough the sophistry of the law and legal arguments’, the colonial 
imposition of extraterritorial protections for foreign trade and investments—originating in 
capital-exporting states—ensured that historical imbalances would rise above 
decolonisation movements and sovereignty claims alike. (156) Those who had expected the 
end of colonialism to pave a path for the adoption of domestic legal preferences learned 
that customary European law beat them to the punch: ‘prescriptions of various standards of 
treatment…secure foreign investment through the neutralization of the power of the state 
to take measures that would be harmful to such investment.’ (171) Even progressive anti-
colonial states fell in line, accepting the controversial claim that foreign investment is ‘the 
basis for economic and social development’ and ‘the promotion of flows of foreign 
investment into developing countries,’ in the end agreeing to make its protection 
primordial. (151) 
                                                                
3 James Thuo Gathii, War, Commerce, and International Law (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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Swapping lenses, moral philosophy is made explicit in the sixth chapter on financial 
globalisation. In contrast to the historical character of trade and investment, finance is the 
new kid on the block, maturing into its current iteration during the neoliberal era. While 
financial globalisation first developed during the nineteenth century, its early forays were 
curtailed by the ensuing intra-European imperial wars. Its character also morphed as the 
‘development finance’ of the colonial era—necessary to extract wealth from the colonies—
was supplanted by the ‘diversification finance’ in circulation today. (182) Development 
finance, as the authors term it, was necessary to extract wealth from the colonies, either by 
dispossessing natives of their resources (capital to colonise) or compelling natives to engage 
in productive-activities (capital to enslave). It possessed a developmental character even if 
the benefits accrued principally for settlers and their overlords. In contrast, current cross-
border financial flows are designed for investors and traders, providing them with a 
framework within which they can hedge and diversify risk. They do this by pooling and 
swapping financial assets between themselves, in what often appears as little more than a 
glorified Ponzi scheme. Diversification enables investors to insulate themselves from market 
risk while heaping systemic risk on states and societies at large. (183) Sovereign debt crises, 
banking crises, currency devaluation crises, and inflation crises, all manifesting post-capital 
account liberalisation, run riot under the pressure of denationalised speculative finance. 
(186-7) Finance overrides sovereignty as an extra-legal framework is devised and managed 
by a host of private institutions (e.g. Berkshire Hathaway), associations (e.g. The 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions), and clubs (e.g. The Paris Club). (190) 
Beyond up-scaling the accumulation of private rights and liabilities, the authors argue that 
the globalisation of finance serves no social purpose. (197-201) 
 
Some, perhaps much of what I have recounted is known to critical IEL scholars and The 
Misery of International Law does not break new ground on the distinct subfields of IEL 
though it does collate the critique in a cohesive and biting anthology. What is pioneering is 
the attempt to comprehensively weave a theory of justice through IEL. Beginning with 
Thrasymachus’s argument in Plato’s Republic— ‘justice is nothing other than the advantage 
of the stronger’—they proclaim, over and over, that IEL ‘is structured to serve power and 
interest.’ (38-39) Thrasymachus’s trap results from the jurisdictional divisions between 
international and domestic law and the differentiated approaches to justice that ensue. In a 
political community such as a nation-state, power is wielded ‘to the advantage of their 
citizens, regardless of the consequences to other states and vulnerable persons in those 
other states.’ (44) Tribal perhaps, nativist even but sovereignty was conceptualised to 
distinguish between those who belong and those who are to be excluded. It comes as no 
surprise that in a world where political legitimacy begins and ends with sovereignty, justice 
would have scarce cross-border purchase. At the international, we have little more than a 
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practical association between co-existing but usually competing political communities. In 
this framework, there is no reason to expect people from distinct political communities to 
feel any responsibility toward one another. It is to this conundrum that the authors propose 
a resolution and what Misery contributes to critical scholarship on IEL. 
 
III 
What way out of Thrasymachus’s trap? They begin by dismissing ‘the description of 
international law as a practical association and no more’. (51) As they rightly point out, the 
penetration of IEL into everyday life has forced national legislatures to reconceptualise 
‘what are typically understood as the domestic affairs of states’ introducing a purposive 
character to international cooperation. (51) Next, they collapse the ‘inside-outside or 
member-not member distinction’ upon which sovereignty is fashioned for international law 
has evolved into ‘a necessary institution within the panoply of institutions that are needed 
for states and their peoples to flourish.’ (53) The mutual reliance of states on common 
markets has embedded social cooperation in the global economy, pointing to an evolution 
from mercantilist conflict to an integrated ‘system of transnational political linkage.’ (55) 
 
Lest they appear idealistic, they underscore that cooperation neither presupposes nor 
requires equality of participants and that the world is essentially divided between rule 
makers and rule takers, a division with flow-on effects for the regulatory framework as rule 
makers collude to advance self-serving IEL. (58) Substantive inequality is interwoven 
throughout the framework, producing a global economy that ‘is morally disordered by 
design.’ (60) All of this is part of a pattern of Eurocentrism in IEL and ‘[w]e should not ignore 
the ‘violence, ruthlessness, and arrogance’ accompanying the disseminating of a European 
vision of international law.’ (65) While geography and history may have some responsibility 
for the ‘impaired starting points’ of societies,4 the authors argue that much more should be 
said about the legal machinations that consistently exploit historic wrongdoings in favour of 
the already powerful and privileged. 
 
There is no easy way forward and, in fact, the authors declare theirs a mission of critique 
and not of prescription. (274) Nevertheless, they do posit an alternate indicator against 
which international lawmaking should be measured: since ‘international law creates and 
maintains relationships with significant moral consequences’, ‘persons affected by 
international law have a right of justification for the rights, liabilities, burdens, and benefits 
it allocates…The right of justification requires that states justify the international legal rules 
they create and apply to persons affected by them.’ (67-68) States must work toward 
improving the moral legitimacy of international law which, to the authors, would involve 
actively supporting the demands of justice. (72) 
                                                                
4 Robert W Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (Basic Books 1977) 161. 
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To this end, they argue for a new barometer against which IEL should be measured, one 
that accounts for multiple justice principles. (72-76) They propose a smorgasbord of 
normative standards including an anti-misery principle, a duty not to harm principle, an 
equality of opportunity principle, a freedom from domination principle, and an anti-
coercion principle. By adopting new principles against which new international law is 
measured, they argue that reform will occur at the level of ‘predistribution’ by making 
‘international just in a structural sense, ex ante, so that the elements of international law 
relevant to the global economy are designed to make it structurally impossible in a practical 
sense for injustice to exist in the global economy in any material sense.’ (75-76) Despite the 
loose sketch, predistribution is promising and further investigation is needed before a 
conclusion can be made. 
 
IV  
The seamless realisation of a project of this magnitude would have been a miracle and 
the authors stumble along the way. Three instances stand out.  
 
First, both tone and content left me wondering who the intended audience is. While IEL 
scholars are lining up to read the book—myself obviously included—the schematic and 
sprawling nature of the scholarship appears more suitable for students or non-IEL scholars. 
To reiterate, the authors’ readily confess the book’s critical and non-prescriptive character. 
Yet there is something startlingly familiar in the critiques levelled. Admittedly each is prolific 
in their respective field so some repetition is to be expected. Here, however, the ambition 
was perhaps excessive, resulting in what are sometimes superficial representations of 
doctrine, history, or critique in IEL subfields. While the justice thread is indeed interwoven 
through and throughout the chapters, the bulk of the analysis appears in the opening 
chapter with subsequent references acting more as restatements than original additions. In 
short, whereas my admiration for the scholars caused me to predict a transcendental 
contribution, what we have instead is a critical exposition of IEL that would sit beautifully 
alongside a textbook in the reading lists of UG and PG courses.  
 
Next, and linked to the initial critique, is the insouciance with which the authors broach 
the controversy surrounding their non-prescriptions. As highlighted in the preceding 
section, they call for the introduction of new normative standards in the regulation of the 
global economy. For illustrative purposes, I press them on their equality of opportunity and 
freedom from domination principles. Self-evidently, the birth lottery is primordial in 
determining a person’s life chances: in which state or postcode are they born? This applies 
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both domestically and internationally.5 (74) They propose that international law ‘neutralize 
bad brute luck’ by changing the structure of trade agreements to account for equality of 
opportunity and freedom from domination. (74) Their concern is that imbalance in 
economic power produces detriments in the negotiated outcomes for impoverished states. 
Of course the history of IEL verifies this point endlessly.  
 
The changes prescribed appear in chapter 4. Hardly circumspect, they begin with a 
throw of the gauntlet: failure to compensate losers of trade agreements is produced by our 
‘lack of imagination about the structure of cooperation in international trade [that] prevent 
us from using these insights to construct new agreements.’ (129) Indeed, due to our lack of 
imagination cooperation and other normative ambitions are more rhetorical than sincere. 
Rather than toothless effusions toward social justice, we must adopt structures that 
‘[integrate] trade, investment, and social justice into non-fragmented rule regimes.’ (129) 
The deep malaise in IEL they bemoan can only be resolved through confrontation where 
with the aim of ‘[exposing] a common set of values’ and creating ‘the possibility of real 
reconciliation.’ (130) 
 
I note two important flaws in their analysis. First, and in contradiction which much of the 
book’s thesis—more on this below—is the inferred inadvertence of the outcomes. Real 
reconciliation is attainable through a procedural exercise aimed at uncovering our common 
set of values. Between who this reconciliation is meant to take place and what basis for this 
common set of values is left unanswered. Drahos and Braithwaite made a similar point 
about the TRIPS, pointing to the Bretton Woods’ institutions embrace of fuzzy values: 
‘[h]ere we have a group of fuzzy values that include cooperating with the poor, recognising 
their autonomy and helping to empower them. How do these values square with the 
detailed technical rule-making that goes on with respect to intellectual property rights in 
trade fora?’6 As it turns out, they do not. Rather, the rules are devised to prevent any 
disturbance to the established hierarchies and privileges. The role of the values is to 
legitimise the intended outcomes. This is known and the preceding chapters acknowledge 
the contested nature of justice, the pathologies intrinsic to IEL, and the perverse outcomes 
precipitated by the global economy. Yet, in some sections of their book, these contradictory 
aims are reduced to ‘frictions between the values and priorities of the different regimes.’ 
(130) As is evident to a plethora of IEL scholars, including the authors, IEL is designed to 
leverage the dominance of economically powerful states against the weaker ones. Adopting 
a ‘freedom from domination’ principle would require upending the entire regime.  
 
                                                                
5 Social Mobility Commission, ‘State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great Britain’ 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications>. 
6 Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, ‘Hegemony Based on Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual Property’ 
(2003) 21 Law in Context 204, 215. 
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This brings me to the second flaw. The authors convincingly argue that ‘[o]ne of the core 
structural defects in international trade agreements is…[that] they structure markets to 
produce winners and losers. They compensate the winners…but they do not compensate 
the losers.’ (129) They bemoan the ‘failure to show respect for persons for suffer harm from 
a trade agreement and have reasonable grounds to complain.’ (129) Two interrelated issues 
arise here. First, that trade agreements produce winners and losers is not only known or 
tolerated but also the very raison d’être of the treaty. It nigh on impossible to imagine a 
state consenting to a treaty that is not aimed at producing putative gains for its population. 
Second, the finiteness of resources means that as some demographics gain, others will 
invariably lose. It is possible, even desirable for a state to intervene with an industrial plan 
intended to address the plight of the demographics that lose. But this is a matter of 
domestic politics. British textile workers surely have reasonable grounds to complain for the 
spiriting away of their sector to China. But the casual inference that their grievance is 
against the EU’s trading partners rather than against the EU or the British government 
stretches the equality of opportunity argument to its inevitable snapping point.  
 
Mercantile politics combine with sovereignty to produce varying degrees of nationalist 
sentiment. To the extent that the human rights narrative clobbers collective interests in 
favour of individual ones, it does so at a domestic level alone. However, the nation, or at 
least the lobbying classes within the nation, remains primordial in the economic ambitions 
of the negotiating parties. That they pursue self-interest above all else is a design feature of 
IEL, one that the authors acknowledge yet also evade across the text. Could it be otherwise? 
I recognise that, here, I too might be bereft of imagination. Unfortunately, the authors do 
not provide adequate support for the argument, instead dwelling on fuzzy values and 
presuming some form of consensus around the social justice aspirations they detail. 
 
This brings me to the final and, perhaps, most damning critique of the book: the 
competing narratives running through it. Across the chapters, the authors provide a 
blistering condemnation of the oppressive character of IEL. Injustice is a leitmotif of the 
international order. This is not an aberration but a design feature. Even today’s imperialist 
remorse, whether expressed for enslavement, genocide, or armed trade, appears as nothing 
more than rhetorical spin. The rule makers persist in their pursuit of a regime that favours 
the interests of a minor demographic, almost always at the expense of the world’s majority. 
Beginning with European monarchical powers and followed by mercantilists, industrialists, 
capitalists, financiers and a plethora of international economic agents in between, the 
authors highlight the dominance of plutocracy, occasionally oligarchy in the governance of 
IEL: ‘[p]owerful states and other global actors have always shaped international law through 
conquests for capitalist expansion and international economic law now constitutes and 
sustains the terms of that expansion. There has never been ‘progress’ towards something 
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better but an allocation of advantages based on the power of the actors who control the 
making of the law in any given historical period. The present is no different.’ (272) 
 
Yet, simultaneously and jarringly, a lot is written about international law’s moral failures, 
about its injustice and, dare I say it, its emancipatory potential: ‘[t]hat international law is 
both constituted by capitalism and constitutive of it seems clear, but it is an open question 
whether international law is path-dependent. The arguments herein for a different type of 
international law, one that better accords with the demands of justice, implies that there 
may still be hope, but if there is it is faint. This book is a contribution to an uphill battle to 
recover international law so that, ‘ordinary life’ might become ‘the focus of the entire 
discipline.’ (37) The authors appear to fall into their own trap, condemning the abhorrent 
design features of international law while calling for the regime’s rescue. It is hard, 
impossible even to reconcile the clash of narratives: if international law is painted with a 
plutocratic brush, if the terms entrench the legacies of Europe’s barbarous past, if the 
privilege of the minority is contingent on the dispossession of the majority, then the 
inequitable distribution they lament is inevitable and IEL is being condemned for its very 
success.  
 
Moreover, as they argue, if the present is the same as the past and power continues to 
inform lawmaking, then their hedging around path-dependency appears duplicitous: are we 
to recover international law from itself; are we to constitute a new international law that is 
not constitutive of capitalism; and, more to the point, what is this ‘different type of 
international law’ they advocate for? (37) Is it just historically immaterial or full-fledged 
utopian? While the authors have only ‘feint hope’ and do not ‘hint at great faith’ in the 
possibility of the reform they aspire to, following my reading of their text, I am left 
wondering if concepts such as faith and hope are not part of the problem. Like good 
technocrats, we persist with magical-thinking in search of a new principle, a new right, and a 
new international law that can ‘[reconstitute] the brutal world’ that international law has 
authored. Does their | our stumble at the finish line not simply allow IEL to live to fight and 
to oppress another day? 
 
V 
The Misery of International Law is a treasure trove. It is a marauding text informed by 
the authors’s revulsion toward the depravity of the world and IEL’s complicity in its design 
and preservation. I have already adjusted my reading list for both UG and PG modules on IEL 
and will also rely on their work in the pursuit of my own scholarship. However, perhaps like 
IEL itself, the authors are victims of their own success: readers are pushed to despair. Hope 
and faith, a right of justification and predistribution (and perhaps a little masochism) will 
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keep us hungry but, once we grasp the scale of the challenge articulated by Linarelli, 
Salomon, and Sornarajah, the only feeling one is left with is misery.  
